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STEPHEN BLANK
AFTER PRIMAKOV
The evolving context of Russian national security policy
FACING IMMINENT IMPEACHMENT, on May 12, 1999 President Boris Yeltsin replaced
Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov with Minister of the Interior, Sergei Stepashin.
Although Stepashins future policies were then undefined, Yeltsins action reveals
much about the context of Russian national security policy. First of all, Yeltsin
elevated his personal security and power above any concern for Russias stability or
security and consciously risked using force to do so. In this respect he resembles his
opponents. By firing Primakov and installing a new cabinet Yeltsin showed his
determination to retain unchecked power at the expense of the states stabilization
and thereby reaffirmed the primacy of the personal, private, factional, and sectoral
interests of Russias elites over any concept of a national interest. Yeltsins actions,
like those of his rivals, reflect what many observers have called the general
privatization of the state.1
That condition denotes a government of men, not laws, and thus arbitrary rule.
Private or sectoral interests can impose their policy agenda and goals upon the
whole state. The elites who make and conduct national security policy constantly
contend with each other, often for purely private, departmental, or sectoral goals,
not clearly defined Russian interests. Similarly private, sectoral, or institutional
actors use the multiple armed forces to erode the states monopoly over the use of
legitimate force and use the state, and even their own official positions as a vehicle
for their personal gain. This situation both reflects and causes the absence of a
settled inter-agency process for security policy or other issues.
Although Primakovs external policies were clearly anti-American and anti-
Western, in the domestic context his government enjoyed considerable Duma
support and represented the first sign of constitutional stabilization in Russia.
1. This applies as well to Russian observers, Celestine Bohlen, A plea to Yeltsin: Free Russia
from puppet masters, New York Times (May 30, 1999): 10.
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Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada
(ISKAN) observed, 
The fact that a new kind of collaboration among the branches of power has
emerged is equally important. For the first time, the Russian Federation
Government is based on the parliamentary majority and is formed to take its
opinion into account. One can dispute the correctness of that opinion but one
cannot deny that the governments de facto accountability to Parliament is a step
toward the creation of a more effective system of checks and balances, without
which it is impossible to arrive at a stable democratic system in Russia and the
restoration of the states ability to fulfill its basic functions.2
Precisely such a government threatened Yeltsin and his court camarilla: the
presidential staff that doubles as an executive branch of the government, his family,
and their retainers, most notably Boris Berezovskii. This kind of regime also has
gained support from the rest of Russias political elite because it lets them make
personal deals and avoid excessive public, legislative, or international scrutiny.
This deinstitutionalization of Russias government, perhaps even more than lasting
economic crisis, lies at the root of all of Russias failures in this decade, reflects the
incompleteness of Russias democratic transition, and is a major cause of its
military weakness.
As a result Russia increasingly resembles a Third World state and such states
typical security profile. Rogov quoted Donald Jensen, the Director of Radio Liberty
who wrote that, 
The Russian states inability to fulfill basic functions  to maintain public
order, preserve the financial system, collect taxes and distribute income, and
provide minimal social security  prompts comparison with developing
countries like Somalia, Haiti, and Liberia where the state has collapsed. []
whereas in Africa the collapse was mainly the result of the tribalist struggle, in
Russia it is the consequence of heated rivalry within the elite, self-interest, and
administrative chaos in Moscow, which together have undermined the Centers
ability to govern effectively. However, to a large extent Russias degeneration
reflects its social disintegration, which has reached the stage where the concept
of the national interest is lost.3
Yeltsins system of multiple militaries that permits a privatization of the means of
public violence also resembles prominent trends in failing African states.4 We can
also analyze the states privatization separately from the concurrent and
overlapping criminalization of the state and society which itself can cause the state
2. Moscow, Nezavisimaia gazeta (electronic version), in Russian (March 3, 1999), Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia (Henceforth FBIS SOV) (March 4, 1999).
3. Ibid.
4. Michael Bratton, Deciphering Africas divergent transitions, Political Science Quarterly,
CXII, 1 (Spring, 1997): 88-89.
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to disintegrate.5 Stepashins successor at the Ministry of Interior, Vladimir
Rushailo, stated that criminal gangs had become so powerful that they could
influence entire regions. This fusion of criminal and ruling elites was visible
already in 1995, if not earlier and also evokes the Third World pattern.6
In essence, the crises of governance and Russian elites reform responses
reflect the pattern of development  or maldevelopment  present in many
African states. In the absence of normal state building, Russias political elites, like
their African counterparts, undertook to construct a parallel political authority  a
shadow state  whose defining characteristics are a corrupt fusion between
government and private sector elites, that stunts institutional development, survives
through predation on productive processes in society, and compels the majority of
the population to withdraw from the sphere of legitimate commerce and political
activity.7
 
Many observers detect similar analogies to the Third World or to earlier
feudalist and Tsarist structures.8
 
 African militaries in many respects bear uncanny
resemblance to Russias multiple militaries. African forces, like Russias, are riven
with politically based factionalism based on leaders personal ambitions, and ethnic
solidarities among soldiers. This factionalism means that they incorporate into
themselves all the cleavages of their societies and states and are thus cliques and
cabals. Often they are not even truly professional military forces but armed mobs.
Deeply politicized, these militaries search for rents to extract from the economy,
endemic criminality, privileged access to resources or the political process, and are
averse to true civilian control.9
 
Similarly reports from Nizhnii Novgorod state that soldiers are begging outside
virtually every shop, not just due to their hunger but because their superior officers
 
5. E.G. Timothy Shaw, Clement E. Adibe, Africa and global developments in the twenty-first
century, 
 
International Journal
 
, LI, 1 (Winter, 1996): 1-26; Mohammad Ayoob, 
 
The Third
World security predicament: State making and the international system
 
 (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1995).
6. Moscow, 
 
Radio Rossii Network
 
, in Russian (May 26, 1999), 
 
FBIS SOV
 
 (May 26, 1999);
Stephen Blank, The code and civil-military relations: The Russian case, in Gert de Nooy, ed.,
 
Cooperative security, the OSCE, and its code of conduct
 
 (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1996): 107-109.
7. Peter Stavrakis, The Russian state in the twenty-first century, Paper presented to the VIII
Annual Strategy Conference of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., April 22-
24, 1997, p. 2.
8. 
 
Ibid.; 
 
M.
 
 
 
Ayoob, 
 
op. cit.
 
; Vladimir Shlapentokh, Early feudalism  The best parallel for
contemporary Russia, 
 
Euro-Asia Studies
 
, XLVIII, 2 (1996): 391-411 ; Peter Stavrakis, 
 
State-
building in post-Soviet Russia: The Chicago boys and the decline of administrative capacity
 
,
Occasional Papers of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 254, 1993, and
Eugene Huskey, The State-legal administration and the politics of redundancy, 
 
Post-Soviet
Studies
 
, XI, 2 (1995): 115-143; David M. McDonald, A lever without a fulcrum: Domestic
factors and Russian foreign policy, 1905-1914, in Hugh Ragsdale, ed. and trans., 
 
Imperial
Russian foreign policy
 
 (Washington, D.C.  Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press 
Cambridge University Press, 1993): 281.
9. One should compare M. Bratton, 
 
art. cit.
 
: 88-89 to Anders Aslund, The state of transition
economies, 
 
Demokratizatsiia
 
, V, 4 (Fall, 1997): 502.
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use threats to force them to get money which they then extort. Naturally nobody
complains since nobody has any confidence in their officers.
 
10
 
 This pattern
certainly bears comparison to earlier European or current Third World models of
backward and failed states. Whereas some observers invoke feudalism, Anatol
Lieven of the International Institute of Strategic Studies compares the utter
irresponsibility of Russias elites and Spains 
 
Caciques
 
 who failed even to have a
sense of the social contract or restraints that true feudalism manifested.
 
11
 
 
Therefore Russias state building challenge resembles that of Third World
states, who face enormous internal and external pressures emanating from
international economic institutions and economic globalization.
 
12
 
 Since Russia too
must follow those institutions guidelines to survive, it cannot be fully sovereign,
faces tight political constraints, and is very vulnerable to economic sanctions and
threats. Many elites have long feared Russias consignment to a permanent role as a
colonial or semi-colonial dependency who exports oil, gas, and raw materials. It
cannot compete in the global economy and is essentially exploited by other richer
powers. Alternatively Russia, who is already in default, may be declared bankrupt,
shutting off almost all foreign investment. Then it would confront coercive
pressures to comply with the U.S. and Western security agenda on a broad range of
issues all the way up to the START treaties. This is not an idle fantasy as there are
U.S. voices urging such steps.
 
13
 
For many Russians even those agencies who can help appear to inhabit a fantasy
world about what can be done. Rogov wrote that,
The IMFs demand for a 4% primary budget surplus as a condition for granting
credit (which must be immediately returned to the IMF as payment for past
loans) means reducing federal expenditure to a level of less than 10% of GNP.
That proportion of spending is less than half that in the United States, and one-
third to one-fourth of that in the West European countries. No state in the world,
not even the prosperous United States, even dreams of a surplus of more than 1%
of GDP. The fulfillment of the IMFs demand would lead in effect to the Russian
Government refusing to fulfill the most elementary functions that are carried out
by the state in any country of the world. The inevitable consequences of this will
be not only socioeconomic collapse, but also the disintegration of the Russian
Federation.
 
14
 
These warnings resemble those of Third World states who have undergone similar,
coinciding, economic, and political crises stemming from trying to placate these
 
10. 
 
Moscow Center TV
 
, in Russian (March 26, 1999), 
 
FBIS SOV
 
 (March 26, 1999).
11. Anatol Lieven, Freedom and anarchy: Russia stumbles toward the twenty-first century,
 
Washington Quarterly
 
, XX, 1 (Winter, 1997): 42-43.
12. Ayoobs model of the Third World states security dilemmas is particularly telling here.
13. 
 
FBIS SOV
 
 (March 4, 1999); Moscow, 
 
Rossiiskaia gazeta
 
, in Russian (April 30, 1999),
 
FBIS SOV
 
 (April 30, 1999).
14. 
 
Ibid
 
.
 AFTER PRIMAKOV
 
699
 
foreign economic masters while effective civil-military control collapses.
 
15
 
 Indeed,
Russias inflation through 1998 and the regimes endemic lawlessness are partly
traceable to its efforts to circumvent the IMF, retain state power or resort to dubious
budgetary procedures of extra-budgetary spending, many of which were
undertaken precisely to sustain one or more military institution.
 
16
 
Obviously security dialogues in such a system remain largely a state or elite
preserve with little popular input. Yet no consensus exists about the national
interest.
 
17
 
 Russias continuing failure to produce a military doctrine underlines that
inability to agree on a definition of the national interest, threats to it, and ways to
defend it. Similarly Yeltsins decree to merge all the nuclear forces into one
strategic nuclear command has still not been implemented due to the General
Staffs and the services opposition. Likewise, the militarys budget is not what the
Duma authorizes but whatever the Ministry of Finance cares to, or is obliged
through outside pressures, to give. This has led military figures to complain that the
Ministry constitutes a second government. Nor are such intra-elite disputes
confined to military issues. The oil and gas companies fought with the Foreign
Ministry over Caspian energy sources for several years and generally prevailed
because of their economic clout, even forcing Primakov to retract some policies.
 
18
 
The fact that Yeltsin was facing impeachment, inter alia, for destroying the
Soviet Union, represents a second element of Russias policy context, namely that
for major constituencies the present system remains fundamentally illegitimate.
Hence they seek to subvert it from within if possible. As Yeltsin said in his speech
to the Duma in March, 1999, their policy is largely one of revanche and revisionism
at home and abroad.
 
19
 
 Yet impeachment probably failed because legislators feared
losing their private perks if the Duma was dissolved. Their failure to impeach
Yeltsin tells us that despite their hostility the systems inherent instability is
paradoxically a stable feature of Russian politics. Hence we can expect a period of
stably operating or repeated manifestations of instability. Still, the vituperativeness
of modern Russian politics is evident in the fact that Deputy Defense Minister,
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov told 
 
Novosti News Agency
 
 and 
 
Argumenty i fakty
 
that Iabloko Party leader Grigorii Iavlinskii and former Foreign Minister and now
Duma Deputy, Andrei Kozyrev were traitors to the motherland.
 
20
 
 Consequently
 
15. M. Ayoob, 
 
op. cit.: passim
 
.
16. Internet communication from Jerry Hough, 
 
Johnsons Russia List
 
, DJohnson@cdi.org
(May 2, 1997) who has been constant in observing how the Yeltsin regime has subsidized banks
and other institutions off the books, see also Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, Russias
virtual economy, 
 
Foreign Affairs
 
, LXXVII, 5 (September-October, 1998): 53-67.
17. Sergei Medvedev, Former Soviet Union, in Paul B. Stares, ed., 
 
The new security agenda:
A global survey
 
 (Tokyo: Japan Center for international Exchange, 1998): 78-81.
18. S. Blank, Every shark East of Suez: The Great Powers and their energy rivalries, in
 
Central Asian Survey
 
, XVIII, 2 (1999) : 149-184 .
19. Moscow, 
 
Russian Television Network
 
, in Russian (March 30, 1999), 
 
FBIS SOV
 
 (March
30, 1999).
20. 
 
Moscow Center TV
 
, in Russian (March 25, 1999), 
 
FBIS SOV
 
 (March 25, 1999).
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agreement on basic issues that are essential to Russias ability to function and
present itself abroad as a state remains in contention.
Vladimir Ryzhkov, leader of the Our Home is Russia faction in the Duma
lamented that Russias main political forces are so divided, weak, mutually
irresponsible, and immature that their views cancel each others out. As a result, 
Debates are still on whether the republic proclaimed by Kerensky on 10
September 1917 was legitimate, whether it is worthwhile to revert to monarchy.
This is the subject of serious debate, as before. We still cannot either recognize
or contest the existing border of the Russian Federation. This is the subject of
heated debate. There is no unity. We have not decided yet whether private
property is legitimate or illegitimate in Russia. This is still the subject of heated
debate. We are still arguing about whether Russia should be a unitary or federal
state. We are still arguing about limits of freedom  political freedom, freedom
of speech, religious freedom. These are also subjects of heated debate and
attacks from all quarters. As a result, I am compelled very regretfully to
conclude that there is is no ground for accord in modern-day Russia. That all
attempts to reach accord are not unlike attempts to paste together two icebergs. I
also am obliged to say that these differences are not the result of irresponsibility,
ill will, or incompetence of politicians. This is to a large extent a real reflection
of the attitudes existing among the masses of people.
 
21
 
This observation leads to the third aspect of the policy context revealed in
Primakovs firing. Russias internal strife and disorganization make the main
threats to Russia internal, not external ones.
 
22
 
 Military strategy, even when it
postulates the West as a whole, or NATO, or specifically the United States as a
danger or potential threat, has been intended, at least until now, first of all for
deterrence, not actual warfighting.
 
23
 
 Not surprisingly, the main mission of the
multiple armed forces, as revealed by its post-1991 actions and the 1993 defense
doctrine is to defend Yeltsins power and the status quo. And since the main threat
is internal, control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is as crucial as  control
over the regular army, a factor that helps explain Stepashins elevation. Thus all the
various armed forces have been thoroughly politicized. Indeed, their politicization
has reached the point where many officers and commentators make it clear that
many of the armed forces would not defend Yeltsin, the legally elected head of
state, against certain kinds of threat to his rule.
 
24
 
 
 
21. Realities of the fourth Russian Republic and war in the Balkans: Editor-in-chief of
 
International Affairs
 
, Boris Piadyshev interviews Vladimir Ryzhkov, 
 
International Affairs
 
, 2
(1999): 2.
22. See the new national security blueprint, Moscow, 
 
Rossiiskaia gazeta
 
, in Russian
(December 26, 1997), 
 
FBIS SOV, 
 
97-364 (December 30, 1997).
23. Presentation by Brigadier General (Ret) John Reppert USA to The Council on Foreign
Relations, Washington, D.C., May 12, 1999.
24. Deborah Yarsike Ball, How reliable are Russias officers?,
 
Janes Intelligence Review
 
(May, 1996): 204-207.
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Ivashovs outburst exemplified this politicization but is only a small part of the
problem. Locally, especially in tense areas like the North Caucasus, officials
engage in all kinds of machinations to involve the serving troops in their political
rivalries.
 
25
 
 But in Moscow this politicization of the military affects the most basic
issues of Russian national security. 
Two examples illustrate the depth of the danger. On March 31, 1999 the Duma
met in closed plenary session with Chief of the General Staff, General Anatolii
Kvashnin, on a broad range of military issues because of NATOs Kosovo
campaign. Kvashnin connived with the Duma to draft resolutions stating that due to
this campaign the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty does not meet Russian
national interests.
 
26
 
 Official news reports stated that the Duma also, 
intends to draw the attention of the head of state to the fact that the strategy of
reforming the Russian armed forces, in accordance with which cardinal
reductions in personnel and changes in the organizational-staff structures have
been effected for several years now without reequipping the armed forces with
modern arms and military technology, no longer meets new geopolitical realities
and poses a threat to Russias national security. In the draft resolution the State
Duma is also planning to point out that the doctrine provisions on the types and
specificities of military actions in which the Russian armed forces may
participate have not been worked out. In the deputies opinion, the adoption of
a decision to change the operations control of troops and arms, first of all,
nuclear without a profound military-scientific and economic substantiation may
cause a substantial damage to Russias defense capability. The State Duma is
planning to draw the attention of the head of state to the fact that: financing the
state defense order in 1996-1998 was carried out with violations of the federal
law On the state defense order.
 
27
 
Since Kvashnin publicly and strongly opposes Defense Minister General Igor
Sergeevs plans for restructuring all nuclear forces under one strategic nuclear
forces command as Yeltsin decreed, his actions constitute clear insubordination,
efforts to reverse major foreign policies, and corrupt the political process. But
nobody seems to have noticed this. By now such phenomena seem quite normal in a
situation where military politicization has long been tolerated as the rule, by
officers and by the government. 
The second example is equally revealing. Apparently the armed forces as a
whole and most of Russias diplomats had no interest in Viktor Chernomyrdin,
Yeltsins roving ambassador on Kosovo, succeeding in finding an acceptable
solution for NATO, Serbia, and Russia in this conflict. Therefore they are active in
seeking to strengthen Mr. Milosevic in his defiance of NATO. Indeed, members of
the military delegation traveling with Chernomyrdin publicly attacked the NATO
 
25. Rostov-na Donu, 
 
Voennyi vestnik Iuga Rossii
 
, in Russian (March 22-28, 1999), 
 
FBIS SOV
 
(May 23, 1999).
26. Moscow, 
 
RIA
 
, in English (March 31, 1999), 
 
FBIS SOV
 
 (March 31, 1999).
27. 
 
Ibid
 
.
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peace plan that he helped to negotiate.
 
28
 
 These elements are bitter about NATO
enlargement and the attacks upon Serbia and have therefore isolated
Chernomyrdin. Of course, Stepashin has no incentive to give power to an extra-
cabinet figure loyal to Yeltsin alone.
 
29
 
 Thus they are subverting Yeltsins policy
and incurring great risks to Russian security to satisfy their own sectoral anger and
interests. 
At the same time, Yeltsins sense of a lurking threat from within explains many
of his military policies since 1991. He has consistently divided and broken up
Russias multiple militaries, playing them off against each other, corrupting
biddable elites within them, and elevating the MVD at the expense of the regular
army. Since 1991 Yeltsin has also consistently refused to raise military spending.
And in any event the funds are unavailable.
But this feckless approach to military policy entails major costs to Russian
security, because it has destroyed the armys defense capability. Except for very
low-level contingencies, Russia lacks usable military force and will do so for a long
time. Furthermore, military spending priorities ensure that this situation will
continue. If the entire state order for 1998 went to the strategic nuclear forces pet
project, the Topol-M SS-27 ICBM  and the current level of finances permits at
best annual production of perhaps 10-15 missiles a year  a revival of the Russian
army by 2005 is a fantasy. High-tech weapons and professional soldiers may exist
in design bureaus or planning boards but they will not come to life under these
circumstances. Thus the military cannot support the objectives of Russian foreign
policy or of self-defense except by invoking nuclear weapons, a dangerous strategy
at any time.
 
30
 
The fourth element of the policy context is that foreign and defense policy are as
much weapons for the domestic struggle as they are disputes and debates over
Russias national interests and how they should be pursued. Primakovs valiant effort
to forge a consensus defining what those interests are and how they should be pursued
is one reason he was fired. This consensus challenged Yeltsins power, authority, and
sense of Russias objectives. By designating Chernomyrdin to negotiate on Kosovo
Yeltsin tried to steer policy away from Primakovs openly and aggressively anti-
American line  complete with Cold War-like military rhetoric akin to that of
Brezhnevs and Andropovs times  to a policy that he could control and modulate.
Primakovs mastery over foreign policy had become a threat to Yeltsins power and
policies which were less stridently anti-American and supportive of higher military
spending than were Primakovs and the armed forces.
 
31
 
28. John Lloyd, Moscow rivalry hampers envoys effectiveness, 
 
Financial Times
 
 (May 24,
1999): 2.
29. 
 
Ibid
 
.; 
 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline
 
 (June 3, 1999).
30. S. Blank, 
 
Russias armed forces on the brink of reform
 
 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998); Moscow, 
 
Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie
 
,
in Russian (March 4, 1999), 
 
FBIS SOV 
 
(March 24, 1999).
31. 
 
Moskovskii komsomolets
 
 (May 18, 1999), 
 
Johnsons Russia List
 
, 3301 (May 23, 1999),
djohnson@erols.com.
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Nevertheless, NATO enlargement, Kosovo, attacks on Russian proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, the collapse of the economy, supposedly due to
American-inspired policies, and the U.S. perceived attempt to oust Russia from all
of its traditional zones of influence and interest have made anti-Americanism the
only basis for an elite consensus on national security policy. This consensus is a
fifth major aspect of the national security policy context. It is ideological and
emotional more than a guide to specific policies and indeed, in many cases it
postulates a never-never land that policy cannot materialize. As articulated by
Primakov and others who supported a global policy to counterbalance American
policies this consensus proclaimed Russia as one of the major poles of a
foreordained and objectively emerging multipolarity because of its potential, if not
reality.
 
32
 
 Russian diplomats and analysts call this policy limited globalism. This
posture mandates a global policy on the basis of a selective engagement in areas
where vital Russian interests are at stake, Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East,
and the Far East, the traditional areas of Russian interests.
 
33
 
 Another view coming
to the fore is one that repolarizes the world into the West and the rest i.e. a West/
East-South polarization.
 
34
 
 This approach too naturally applies to many in Russia,
but both these schemes have a common origin based on anger, fear, shame, years of
unending frustration, resentment, a burning desire for compensation and
recognition that cannot be satisfied. At the source of this common origin lies the
mystique of 
 
derzhavnost 
 
  Russias supposedly objective status of a great
power now and in the future. At the core of this mystique is a refusal or inability to
accept conclusively the full sovereignty of the CIS states and the rest of the todays
status quo. 
Even a liberal like Duma member Aleksei Arbatov of the Iabloko party writes
that Russia is objectively a great power because of its global political clout. In the
broad geopolitical zone that it inhabits it is the most important player, even if
sometimes the decision goes against its interests. Russia is therefore destined to be
 
32. Yeltsin address to diplomats, 
 
Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn
 
, 6 (June 1998), and 
 
The Russian
Weekly
 
, 6 (July 24, 1998), davidjohnson@erols.com (henceforth Yeltsin address). See also
Moscow, 
 
Vooruzhenie, politika, konversiia
 
, 2 (February 1, 1997), 
 
FBIS SOV
 
 (August 23,
1998) for an interview with Ivan Rybkin, then Secretary of the Security Council, and Russias
national interests, 
 
Johnsons Russia List
 
 (August 15, 1997), davidjohnson@erols.com; Paul
Goble, Can Russian diplomacy hold Russia together, 
 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Newsline
 
 (September 23, 1998); 
 
The Monitor
 
 (March 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998);
Yevgeny Primakov, Russia: Reforms and foreign policy, 
 
International Affairs
 
 (Moscow), 4
(1998): 3-6.
33. Yeltsin address; Ivan Rybkin on Russias global role
 
, Johnsons Russia List
 
 (July 8,
1997), davidjohnson@erols.com; Moscow, 
 
Izvestiia
 
, in Russian (January 21, 1998), 
 
FBIS
SOV, 
 
98-034 (February 3, 1998); Oleg V. Davydov, Russias foreign policy in transition:
Prospects and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, 
 
Asian Perspective,
 
 XXII, 1 (Spring,
1998): 53-69; Mikhail A. Alekseev, Russias cold peace consensus: Transcending the
presidential election, 
 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs
 
, XXI, 1 (Winter-Spring 1997): 33-51;
Ambassador Evgeny V. Afanasiev, Asia-Pacific region: A Russian perspective, Paper
presented to the Annual National Defense University, Asia-pacific Symposium, Honolulu,
Hawaii, March, 1-2, 1999.
34. E. V. Afanasiev, 
 
art. cit..
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a great power because objectively it has great responsibilities that nobody else can
assume, especially in the CIS.
 
35
 
 The problem with this assessment is that it forces
Moscow to confront challenges that it cannot now or in the foreseeable future
sustain. As it is, Russia in fact cannot conduct such a policy except by diplomatic
legerdemain.
 
36
 
 If the West can do whatever it wishes with us Russia is not a great
power but rather an enormous, unwieldy, quasi-colonial dependency, a great power
by the sufferance of others. 
Because this mystique of 
 
derzhavnost
 
  precludes recognition of the CIS
members equal sovereignty, its conceptualization leads Russia to assume enormous
but unrealizable military-political burdens and goals. Certainly it lies at the heart of
the elites widespread aspirations for a major revision of the post-1989 status quo.
Key Russian figures embrace a frankly revisionist agenda as the cornerstone of
their aspirations for the future. Since Russian elites tie Russias continuation as a
state to the reintegration of the CIS, NATO enlargement threatens to frustrate that
reintegration and undermine their sense of Russias state identity. Russian elite
definitions of the state are bound up with the belief in a predestined reintegration of
the CIS  whose members supposedly cannot govern themselves and remain
artificial states  around Russia lest Russia otherwise collapse.
 
37
 
 Accordingly,
though not logically, Russian officials persist in believing that reintegration, largely
on Russias terms, will take place, that it is objectively (a favorite word)
determined, and is necessary for Russias survival. Hence a revisionist agenda is
called for even if it must be expressed sotto voce. Primakov told the OSCE in 1996
that:
Today, the balance of forces resulting from the confrontation of the two blocs
no longer exists, but the Helsinki agreements are not being fully applied. After
the end of the Cold War certain countries in Europe  the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia  have disintegrated. A number of new states
were formed in this space, but their borders are neither fixed nor guaranteed by
the Helsinki agreements. Under the circumstances, there is a need for the
establishment of a new system of security.
 
38
 
As Russia also demands guarantees of its integrity against secessionist threats
while the Ministry of Defense insists on retaining the old Soviet borders, Primakov
 
35. Aleksei Arbatov, Iz tochki zreniia Parlamenta, 
 
Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn
 
, 3 (1999): 80-
93.
36. 
 
Ibid
 
.
37. Andrei Kokoshin, 
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confirmed what Aleksei Arbatov called the duplicity of Russian border policy.39
Nor is Primakov alone in this quest. 
Andrei Kokoshin, former Secretary of the Security Council and Deputy Defense
Minister, wrote in 1997 that:
Russias security will be determined to a great extent by the process of the
reintegration of the former Soviet Union. The social, cultural, geopolitical, and
even historical prerequisites for the strengthening of this process already exist.
Russian history bears witness to the fact that the changes in the geography of the
state that occurred in the 1990s are not irreversible. If one looks at the space
occupied by the Russian empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and
by the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, one can envisage the emergence
there of a new, viable state-political entity.40
Alla Iazkova of Moscow State University and the Institute of World Economics
International Relations (IMEMO), openly says that Russia really would prefer a
situation like that of 1945 and that the Russian elite intends to use the issue of
Russians abroad as a means to destabilize Georgia, Moldova, the Baltic states, and
possibly Ukraine.41 She goes on to observe that:
After a series of nationalist demonstrations, both within the newly independent
states and the Russian Federation, a consensus has emerged among a wide
spectrum of Russian political organizations that Russian minorities in the Near
Abroad must be protected. In this regard it is worth noting that a majority of
Russians living in the new independent states appear to support some variant of
the extremist agenda of Vladimir Zhirinovskii. Many have backed secessionist
efforts such as those in Abkhazia and Tranistria, as well as the armed conflict in
Chechnya. Despite this tendency toward extremism, Russia will continue to gear
its policies toward the new independent states on the basis of their treatment of
Russian minorities, though the means via which influence will be exerted will
differ depending on the situation.42
The linked fear of disintegration leads Russias elite to make the defensive
demand a sphere for influence along Russias perimeter, i.e. the Baltic and CIS
states, to guard against further disintegration of Russia proper.43 And there are
analysts who believe that border revisions among CIS states that carve them up are
feasible solutions to the problems of ethnic conflict that have plagued them and
39. Moscow, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, in Russian, (July-
September, 1994), FBIS SOV, 94-129 (November 29, 1994): 48.
40. A. Kokoshin, op. cit.: 31.
41. Alla Iazkova, The emergence of post-Cold War Russian foreign policy priorities, in
Robert Craig Nation and Stefano Bianchini, eds, The Yugoslav conflict and its implications for
international relations (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1998): 112.
42. Ibid.: 111.
43. Moscow, Nezavisimaia gazeta (NG stsenarii-supplement), in Russian (June 28, 1996),
FBIS SOV, 96-128 (July 3, 1996).
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Russia since 1992.44 Vasilii Krivokhiza, First Deputy Director of Russias Institute
for Strategic Studies, brings together much of what passes for establishment
thinking by insisting on Primakovs concept of a multipolar world, global equality
with Washington, defense of Russias integrity through reintegration, and regional
engagement in a single whole that is shot through with old-fashioned and frankly
imperialist notions of Russian security objectives. Krivokhiza writes that:
The more than thousand year experience of the Russian state and elementary
common sense demonstrate that geopolitical constants exist. One of these is the
fact that stability inside Russia leads to her augmentation whereas instability
leads to her neighbors seizing [of] her territory, and even to centrifugal
inclinations on the part of a number of her territories. This means that, in order to
consolidate the CIS in one form or another, after having in parallel strengthened
Russia, it is necessary in the first place to solve the problems inside Russia itself
and to create international conditions that are favorable for the achievement of
these goals. This is why any kind of isolationism in our relations with our close
and distant neighbors is undesirable. But it is better to solve this task by means
of the promotion of global or, at a minimum, of regional initiatives.45
Because the disparity between Russian objectives and the available means is
enormous it could be the source of a major international crisis. And there is no way
that Russias armed forces can realize these goals even for the CIS under present
conditions. For example, Russia now seeks to redouble its efforts to impose
extended nuclear deterrence against any attack on CIS states, even if nobody asked
for it and despite the profoundly dangerous risks for Russia.46
Russia must extend this deterrence, not only because of its legitimate vital
interest in CIS affairs, but also lest it too becomes a target of those attacks.47 This
reasoning applies even to small-scale conventional attacks for which a nuclear
response is contraindicated.48 Also on the basis of this logic Primakov advocated a
global foreign policy because Russia is a great power without whom no major
international problem can be solved, just as in Brezhnevs time.49 As two high-
44. Edward Ozhiganov, The Republic of Moldova: Transdniester and the 14th Army, in
Alexei Arbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, and Lara Olson, eds, Managing
conflict in the former Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997): 206-207.
45. Vasily Krivokhiza, Russias national security policy: Conceptions and realities, Richard
Weitz, trans. (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
1998), Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, 1998: 32.
46. Moscow, Segodnia, in Russian (April 30, 1999), FBIS SOV (April 30, 1999).
47. S. Blank, Proliferation and counterproliferation in Russian strategy, and Remarks on
Russia, in Jim Colbert, ed., Proceedings from the Conference on countering the missile threat:
International military strategies, February 22, 1999 (Washington, DC: Jewish Institute for
National Security Affairs, 1999): 127-149; 41-45.
48. Ibid.
49. E-mail letter from Darrell Hammer, Johnsons Russia List (February 5, 1997), Dmitry
Trenin, Transformation of Russian foreign policy: NATO expansion can have negative
consequences for the West, Nezavisimaia gazeta (February 5, 1997), E-mail transmission,
J. Michael Waller, Primakovs imperial line, Perspective, VII, 3 (January-February 1997): 2-6, 
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ranking General Staff officers argued in a 1997 study even states lacking political
and economic power can play major roles and be system forming poles in world
politics supposedly objectively emerging multipolar structure.50 The fact that
Russia has nothing to contribute to many issues other than obstruction seems to
elude such analysts.
These policies are ruinous to Russia. They also destabilize its neighborhood
making foreign intervention that much more likely. Foreign observers who see how
Moscow tramples upon its neighbors interests and acts like a neo-imperial
hegemonic bully retain an enemy image of Russia. As the Finnish Institute of
International Affairs Russia 2010 report recently stated:
In the realm of foreign and security policy, Russia is not committed to the
principles of democratic peace and common values. Its chosen line of
multipolarity implies that Russia is entitled to its own sphere of influence and
the unilateral use of military force within it. Russia refuses to countenance any
unipolar hegemonic aspirations, in particular it will not accept security
arrangements in which the United States seems to have a leading role. As a
solution, Russia proposes a Europe without dividing boundaries which will,
however, require a buffer zone of militarily non-aligned countries between
Russia and NATO. Russias idea of Europes new security architecture is
therefore based on an equal partnership of great powers and supportive
geopolitical solutions  not on common values accepted by all, nor on the right
of every small state to define their own security policy. The above summary of
recent Russian developments is, in every aspect, practically in opposition to
Finlands and the EUs fairly optimistic goals.51
 This consensus exists alongside the bitter quarrels over exactly what to do. In
conformity to a sense of imminent danger of the states disintegration, 
All political leaders and groups in Russia agree, therefore, that Russias first
foreign policy objective must be to reverse Russias internal decline. Russia
today cannot be a major international actor with a shrinking economy that today
is roughly the size of Denmark. Russia cannot be a serious player on the
international stage if it cannot control its own borders. No major political force
in Russia disagrees with these objectives. How Russia should achieve economic
growth and preserve internal unity, however, remain contested issues.52
50. V. K. Potemkin and Yu. V. Morozov, Strategic stability in the twenty-first century,
European Security, VI, 3 (Autumn, 1997): 43.
51. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Russia beyond 2000: The prospects for Russian
developments and their implications for Finland (Helsinki, 1999): 1-2 (Emphasis author).
52. Michael McFaul, Testimony on what are Russian foreign policy objectives, House
Committee on International Relations, May 12, 1999, Johnsons Russia List, 3283 (May 12,
1999), djohnson@erols.com.
Primakov, setting a new, tougher foreign policy,Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press,
XLIX, 2 (February 12, 1997): 4-7 ; Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Russian foreign policy and security
in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Central Asian Survey, XII, 2 (1993): 187 for Primakovs
globalism and statement that history never nullifies geopolitical values.
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Similarly all serious Russian political forces agree on the need for greater
economics, political, and military cooperation with neighboring CIS states and on
establishing a sphere of influence there. Nor do they disagree on maintaining
Russias nuclear superpower status since that stockpile is the one thing that gives
Russia whatever status it now possesses. Yet, as nobody can agree how to carry out
these objectives, the means of achieving them increasingly elude realization.53 
The sixth aspect of the security policy context is, of course, the terrifying
economic situation. Yeltsin officially fired Primakov for failing to shift the
economy onto a growth track. Although the bottom did not fall out of the economy
as was widely predicted, it still cannot grow. Primakovs government had no recipe
for growth other than a quasi-statist policy that Primakov strangely likened to the
New Deal.54
 Meanwhile the economy, even after much transformation, remains excessively
burdened by military requirements that cannot be sustained yet are inserted into the
economy either legally or through extra-budgetary machinations. 
Any perusal of the Russian press reveals at once a state threatened on all sides by
not just classical security threats but by rising epidemics of drug use, broken down
ecological and health systems, lack of investment in science, education, housing,
etc., an army that cannot feed itself  official denials to the contrary
notwithstanding  and so on. Russia could come apart simply from these internal
pathologies without any exertion of foreign pressure and the elites know it. Yet
pressure to remilitarize the economy has grown without interruption since
Primakov took power.55 
Many military and political elites still believe in living beyond Russias means.
Kosovo encouraged them to demand major increases in military spending, review
of all arms control treaties to which Russia is a party, enhanced readiness of the
nuclear component, and guarantees that Russia could test its weapons without
violating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In the realm of strategy Kosovo has
led them to openly urge combat use at a lower threshold for Tactical Nuclear
Weapons (TNW) in the context of a new military doctrine that emphasizes large-
scale conventional or even nuclear war again.56 There are also many signs of a
determination to upgrade conventional forces like the SU-25 Fighter, expand
substantially the extent of military cooperation with Armenia and Belarus, increase
defense spending or at least make it more reliable and in tune with Yeltsins past
53. Ibid.
54. Moscow, Kommersant-Daily (September 22, 1998), FBIS SOV (September 22, 1998).
55. S. Blank, Yevgeny Primakov and Russias proliferation strategy: What we should expect,
The Monitor (University of Georgia), IV, 4 (Fall, 1998): 3-14; Moscow, Segodnia, in Russian
(May 27, 1999), FBIS SOV (May 28, 1999).
56. S. Blank, New trends in Russian defense strategy and policy (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.:
Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College, forthcoming); Deborah Yarsike Ball, How
Kosovo empowers the Russian military (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Davis Center
for Russian Studies, April, 1999), Program on new approaches to Russian security, Policy
memo, 61: 2-4 ; Russias national security concept, Moscow, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie,
in Russian (January 14, 2000), FBIS SOV (January 14, 2000).
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orders, and enhance conventional forces readiness.57 Kosovo also led to the largest
across the board exercises ever conducted by Russias regular forces. The fact that
these exercises occurred while the armed forces cannot guarantee their men three
meals a day and cannot afford its full complement of uniforms, let alone usable
weapons reveals the Ministry of Defenses (MOD) true priorities.58 All this takes
place meanwhile military reform as planned and decreed since 1997 cannot be
consummated because it is based on economic indicators and expectations that
remain essentially unreal or unrealizable within the term of the projected reform.59
Obviously while the economy stagnates no creative departures or restoration of
Russias international weight and national power are possible irrespective of
whatever policy the United States or other governments adopt. Russias
marginality or sheer irrelevance to many of todays pressing international security
issues will then continue and probably grow. Thus in a real sense, the issue is not
economic policy, but as Vladimir Ryzhkov observes, the absence of a functioning
state.60
As long as the state itself is in upheaval Russia cannot meet the requirements of
either the classical security agenda of military capability, prosperity, and territorial
integrity nor the so called new security agenda that adds migration, pollution in all
its forms, drug trafficking, transnational crime, etc. to the classical agenda.61 If the
state cannot be the engine of stability and recovery, nobody else will replace it and
Russia risks further anomie and social disintegration. The states power to obstruct
other agencies or the ruined civil societys initiatives is still too great to be checked
in the conditions of a blasted economy and half-pauperized society. 
Military strategy and doctrine comprise a seventh element of this context, but
were not directly on view in Primakovs firing. These issues are undergoing serious
review due to Kosovo. Defense Minister General Igor Sergeev recently announced
that publication of a new military doctrine would await updated Russian
assessments of the Kosovo campaign. Nevertheless Yeltsin has ordered a new
doctrine and/or strategy, largely due to Kosovo.62 While this may be a political
dodge since the oft-promised new doctrine has yet to appear despite many earlier
promises; it may also represent at least part of the truth. The failure to sustain the
goals of the 1997 military reform because the armed forces are still too large (1.2
million as opposed to a total force of about 60% of that size) and the inability to
climb out of economic crisis has not led Moscow to revise its still global threat
57.  Moscow, Rossiiskaia gazeta, in Russian (May 7, 1999), FBIS SOV (May 7, 1999);
Moscow, Moskovskii komsomolets, in Russian (May 6, 1999), FBIS SOV (May 7, 1999);
Moscow, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, in Russian (April 16-22, 1999), FBIS SOV (May 3,
1999).
58. Moscow, Voeninform military news agency, e-mail service in English (May 4, 1999), FBIS
SOV (May 8, 1999); D. Y. Ball, How Kosovo ..., op. cit.: 3.
59.  S. Blank, Russias armed forces..., op. cit. 
60.  Realities of the fourth Russian Republic, art. cit.: 1-12.
61.  S. Medvedev, op. cit.: 75-116.
62.  Erevan, Snark, in Russian (May 20, 1999), FBIS SOV (May 20, 1999).
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assessments which lack any sense of priority among them.63 Instead Kosovo,
coming on top of NATO enlargement has added to the intensity with which those
assessments are made. As a recent Western analysis of Russian perceptions argues:
For Russia all the hypothetical security concerns of the past decade are the
threats of today. NATO is now closer to Russian borders, and is bombing a non-
NATO state. Even before NATOs new strategic concept, the alliances
development of Combined Joint Task Forces offered ways for the alliance to
employ forces outside the constraints of Article 5 (self-defense). NATOs
changes, combined with its determination to use force against non-members
threatens Russia because political turmoil in the former Soviet Union increases
the likelihood of NATO involvement near and perhaps even in Russia. Moscow
has long feared that expansion of the alliance could radicalize or destabilize
neighboring countries, sparking internal splits or civil wars that could drag in
Russia  a role it neither wants nor can afford.
Unfortunately, NATO-Russia cooperation failed to address these concerns
even before Kosovo. After Kosovo, it is difficult to see what kind of cooperative
relationship NATO and Russia can have. For one thing, the air strikes [as viewed
from RussiaSB] violated several principles of the NATO-Russia Founding
Act-primarily NATOs commitments limiting its right to use force and
promising the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. Russians interpret the
ongoing military campaign absent UN Security Council approval as NATOs
drive for unilateral security in Europe. NATOs new Strategic Concept adopted
at the 50th anniversary expanded the alliances mission to include non-NATO
Europe as a potential area for further NATO use of force. While the Concept
recognizes the role of the UN Security council, it does not require that NATO
obtain [a] UN mandate for actions beyond the alliances border.64
Rather, based on these perceptions, we can see a further change in strategy towards
even greater reliance on nuclear weapons, particularly TNW that has ominous
implications. 
While the new trends in military strategy and doctrine are most disturbing, the
two most immediate areas that are especially stressful for Russia are the federal
structure of Russia, the impact of the Kosovo issue on Russia. This is because those
issues highlight the dangerous implications of the intersection or interaction of
many of these contextual features for the future conduct of national security policy. 
63. Colonel-General V. M. Barynkin, Voennye ugrozy Rossii i problemy razvitiia ee
vooruzhennykh sil, Voennaia mysl, 1 (January-February, 1999): 2-10; S. Blank, Valuing the
human factor: The reform of Russian military manpower, Proceedings of the JINSA-SSI
Conference on Manpower and Technology at the End of the 20th Century (Washington, DC:
Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs, 1998): 36-46.
64. Celeste A. Wallander, Russian views on Kosovo: Synopsis of May 6 panel discussion
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Davis Center for Russian Studies, April, 1999),
Program on new approaches to Russian security, Policy memo, 62: 3-4.
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Kosovo and Russian strategy
Russias response to Kosovo ties together the consequences of military weakness
and isolation due to excessive claims in Europe. NATOs campaign in Kosovo has
exacerbated the militarys bloody-mindedness and its fears. This reaction may be
humanly understandable but these strategic responses contain high levels of risk for
Russia. Military and political writers led by Primakov and the MOD castigated the
Kosovo campaign as a rupture of all civilized post-1945 rules of international
conduct.65 This reportage betrayed both the armed forces Soviet-type rhetoric and
the unreformed quality of military thinking under constant crisis conditions. 
The Kosovo crisis confronts Moscow with many of the threats that it charged
would arise out of NATOs enlargement. 
First of all, the specter of a rebellious province seeking both independence and
outside military-political support due to ethnic misrule greatly alarms Moscow.
Russias leaders all state that Russias greatest threat is the breakup of the state.66
Kosovos example awakens fears of another Chechnya, but now with foreign
support. 
Second, Kosovo, coupled with NATO enlargement and the U.S. clear
determination to make NATO an expanding extra-European peacemaker that can
act directly on the basis of humanitarian issues, ethnic, and civil violence outside
treaty members borders, ties together many issues that could threaten Russia.
NATO could then bypass the UN and any Russian check on its activities.
Moscow has always charged that NATO enlargement and the promise of a second
or third round shows that ultimately, and despite rhetoric to the contrary, NATO
does not take Russian interests seriously. If NATO acts alone then Russia is
excluded from the most dynamic and active security organization in Europe. Thus
Kosovo could portend Russias marginalization in the Balkans. 
This danger became more acute once Moscow commenced intensive
negotiations with NATO because Moscow suspects that NATO regards it solely as
its courier to Milosevic and not as a power with something to contribute. Materially
speaking this perception is accurate, but it is no less infuriating for being correct.
Chernomyrdin was quite obviously infuriated by President Clintons recent article
where he said that Russia is now helping to work out a way for Belgrade to meet
our conditions and that NATOs strategy can strengthen, not weaken our
fundamental interest in a long-term positive relationship with Russia.67 This
shows Moscow that Washington neither understands it nor cares to and is
65. D. Y. Ball, How Kosovo..., op. cit.: 1-2.
66. Prism, 20, Pt. 1 (October 16, 1998); Yeltsin address; see also Moscow, Vooruzhenie,
politika, konversiia, op. cit., and Russias National Interests, art. cit.; P. Goble, art. cit.; The
Monitor (March 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998); Yevgeny Primakov, Russia: reforms and
foreign policy, art. cit..
67. Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, Impossible to talk peace with bombs falling, Washington Post
(May 27, 1999): 39; William Jefferson Clinton, A just and necessary war, New York Times
(May 23, 1999): E15.
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essentially lost in some dangerous irresponsible dream of its own global mandate
based on its own self-appointed rectitude.
Third, because Russia views NATO as essentially a military alliance, whatever
NATO may claim, it regards NATOs expansion as the further augmentation of a
hostile military alliance and a negative correlation of armed forces with a proven
tendency for acting irresponsibly. Even if there is no threat today and Russia is
downsizing its forces due to its own needs and the absence of threat, its threat
assessment process remains heavily based on correlation of forces modeling that
demands an inordinately large force in order to defend against a conventional
NATO attack.68
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov even told a Canadian audience that the future
world structure will depend on the Balkan settlement.69 Therefore Russian
spokesmen contend that because of Kosovo states will go nuclear to thwart U.S.
military power, thereby accelerating the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.70 Ukraines Supreme Council voted to do this and many in Russia and
Belarus advocate moving nuclear weapons into Belarus, thereby renuclearizing
Europes security agenda.71 Such outcomes only heighten Russias security
dilemmas by forcing it into unsustainable multilateral and global arms races at both
the conventional and nuclear levels. Fourth, NATOs forceful action also suggests
that it might forcibly reply to any effort to realize Moscows revisionist aspirations. 
Kosovos fifth threat to Russia is that to the degree that NATO expands towards
former Soviet borders, it directly threatens either constant pressure on Russia
proper with the threat of force, or the actual possibility of the use of overwhelming
conventional forces in such fashion as to negate possibilities even for nuclear
reprisal.72 In response to NATOs unilateralism Russian diplomats endlessly urge
that the OSCE be the core and coordinator of European security, but they will not
give it the authority to command or to make sure that its desiderata are
implemented. They still believe that Moscow can impose its own solution in ethnic
68. Reiner Huber, NATO enlargement and CFE ceilings: A preliminary analysis in
anticipation of a Russian proposal, European Security, V, 3 (Autumn, 1996): 400; Reiner K.
Huber, Gernot Friedrich, NATO enlargement and Russian security: A comparison of findings
from two analytical approaches, ibid., VII, 3 (Autumn, 1998): 28-42, and V. Tsygichko and
Reiner Huber, Assessing strategic stability in a multi-polar international system: Two
approaches, Robert Lowe, trans. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies office,
1997), unpublished paper; Col.-General Nikolai Pishchev, NATO: Myths and reality,
Krasnaia zvezda (January 5, 1997), cited in Johnsons Russia List (January 5, 1997),
davidjohnson@erols.com; Moscow, Krasnaia zvezda, in Russian (October 14, 1998), FBIS
SOV (October 15, 1998).
69. Moscow, RIA News Agency, in Russian (May 19, 1999), FBIS SOV (May 19, 1999).
70. Moscow, Segodnia, in Russian (March 25, 1999), FBIS SOV (March 25, 1999).
71. Ibid. Such complaints ignore the fact that Russia since 1991 has consciously abetted every
proliferator from North Korea to Libya, except possibly Pakistan, as a matter of state policy.
72. Moscow, Krasnaia zvezda, in Russian (June 26, 1998), FBIS SOV, 98-177 (June 29, 1998).
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issues on its periphery despite long-standing evidence to the contrary.73 Russia has
not previously heeded OSCE criticisms of its conduct and will defy it when it
believes its interests are at stake.74 Instead, Moscow wants nobody to be able to act
in Europe unless it is consulted, while simultaneously retaining an exclusive free
hand in the CIS. Moscow interprets the Founding Act with NATO as giving it the
right to veto any NATO action and demand prior consultation, an interpretation that
NATO vehemently denies.75 But as there was certainly plenty of consultation with
Russia before the bombing, the real problem is that NATO disregarded Russias
claims and rightly suspected its motives. Hence Russia is angered by its own
impotence to make its voice heard or achieve its objectives. 
But Moscow now fears that NATO might use force unilaterally to intervene in
ethnic or civil conflicts within the CIS. Russian spokesmen see the humanitarian
grounds for intervention in Kosovo, that the violent suppression of an ethnic
minority threatens European security, as a potential pretext for NATOs unilateral
intervention in the CIS or even in Russia proper.76 Therefore Deputy Chief of Staff,
General Valerii Manilov stated that any such intervention would be regarded as an
act of aggression and probably break up the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint
Council.77 Lt. General Leonid Ivashov threatened that Moscow would then walk
out of the Permanent Joint Council and the Partnership for Peace, repudiate the
arms embargo against Serbia, and generally rupture East-West relations.78
Another issue arising out of Kosovo is that since Serbia also seeks to resist the
United States and NATO, its support for Russia and Russian support for it are of
value to Moscow in forcing others to take Russia seriously and in preserving its
standing as a great European power. Finally, some Russian analysts see the attacks
on Serbia not only as efforts to undermine multi-national states like Russia, they
also argue that the United States is trying to oust Russia from the Balkans and
beyond that the CIS as it extends its influence there.79
73. Nikolai Afanasevskii, The OSCE summit in Lisbon, International Affairs (Moscow), 1
(1997): 35. At the time he was Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia; Alexander A. Konovalov and
Dmitri Evstatiev, The problem of ethnic minority rights protection in the newly independent
states, in Ian M. Cuthbertson, Jane Leibowitz, eds, Minorities: The new Europes old issue,
Joseph S. Nye Jr., foreword (New York: Institute for East-West Studies, 1993): 159-160.
74. S. Blank, Russia and Europe in the Caucasus, European Security, IV, 4 (Autumn, 1995):
622-645; S. Neil MacFarlane, The UN, the OSCE, and the Southern Caucasus, Caspian
Crossroads, III, 1 (1997): 18-22; S. Blank, The code and civil-military relations, art. cit.: 93-112.
75. Moscow, Interfax, in English (October 10, 1996), FBIS SOV, 96-199 (October 15, 1996);
Lawrence McQuillan, Who has veto power under NATO-Russia accord, Reuters (May 14,
1997).
76. FBIS SOV (October 14, 1998), Moscow, Krasnaia zvezda, in Russian (November 23,
1996), FBIS SOV, 96-229 (November 27, 1996).
77. Moscow, Kommersant, in Russian (November 13, 1998), FBIS SOV (November 13, 1998),
Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English (November 12, 1998), FBIS SOV (November 12, 1998).
78. Moscow, Novye izvestiia, in Russian (October 14, 1998), FBIS SOV (October 14, 1998).
79. Russia makes another attempt to protect Serbs from NATO, Current Digest of the Post-
Soviet Press, L, 23 (July 8, 1998): 23; Sofia, Demokratiia, in Bulgarian (July 2, 1998), Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Eastern Europe, 98-183 (July 6, 1998).
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There are, however, still other fears that lie behind Moscows response to this
intervention. They are tied to the sense of Russias economic-military-political
weakness and that its stability hangs by a thread. NATOs demonstrated ability to
act unilaterally in Iraq and Kosovo with impunity threatens the basis of strategic
stability and Moscows deep-rooted hope of a multipolar evolution of the
international system. The General Staff study cited above makes this clear. The
studys authors offered what must be taken as authoritative definitions of the terms
strategic stability and international stability that clearly rule out NATOs
campaign in Kosovo. If Kosovo is not an aberration Russia then faces what these
writers consider to be a unipolar outcome with highly dangerous consequences.
Strategic stability relates to the sphere of inter-state relations and is a structural
element of international stability. In turn, international stability should be
understood as a condition of international relations in which these relations
develop without crisis, despite the existence of destabilizing factors in the
political, economic, military, and other spheres. In the context of this approach,
strategic stability should be understood as a quality of inter-state relations in the
military-political sphere, which even under crisis conditions, prevents the sides
from using methods of military force to achieve their purposes. This quality also
prevents a quantitative and qualitative arms race and makes it possible to avoid
provoking military activity.80
If Kosovo is a harbinger of the future then strategic stability as well as a broader
international stability are at risk due to NATOs unipolar drive and Russia faces the
threat of quantitative and qualitative arms races. To counterbalance the United
States Russia must go back to a hopeless nuclear arms race that will bankrupt it and
which it cannot win since these weapons are not usable except dire conditions and
have predictable results. As they write, 
In a monopolar model of the world in which the dominant role is played by
some single state, the other actors in inter-state relations will invariably have to
use a system of counterbalances. If this system of counterbalances is going to
rest on nuclear weapons, then nuclear weapons could become a destabilizing
factor in the twenty-first century.81
Two conclusions immediately suggest themselves. One is political and the other is
military. Politically Russia objects to any intervention by force and stresses that
only the UN or OSCE can allow such intervention. Yeltsins threats to leave the
negotiations if the West did not take Russia seriously indicates that Russia is not
taken seriously, mainly because it has nothing to offer and it is not clear that it can
deliver Milosevic to the allies. But NATO disregards Russias diplomacy and has
continued to bomb even while negotiating with Moscow. NATO spokesmen
intimate that Yeltsins rhetorical threat of pulling out of the negotiations is for
80.  V. K. Potemkin and Yu. V. Morozov, art. cit.: 39 (Italics in the original)..
81. Ibid.: 41-42 (Italics in the original).
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domestic purposes only and continue to profess Russias importance while
conducting their policy as if Russia were not there.
This leaves Russia with only the second, military response. It appears in
Sergeevs demands for more spending and widespread political-military calls for a
new nuclear and TNW-based strategy as noted above. While this is not truly a new
strategy since many hints of this go back several years  and it is not clear what
those thresholds for nuclear use would be and against what contingencies they
would be employed  nevertheless the turn in Russian strategy to consider the
primacy of nuclear weapons is corroborated by much military argumentation and
post-1991 production figures. Those figures have emphasized production of
weapons suited for East-West conventional theater offensives, intercontinental
nuclear war at land and sea, and heavy spending on nuclear command and control.82
Federal issues and Russian national security
Another key factor shaping Russias policy context is its failed federal bargain.
This failure brings together many of the pathologies in state building, economics,
and civil-military relations. These pathologies oblige local governments to grab
ever more power and resources from a faltering center. Absent respect for legal and
constitutional procedure, the government and the Federation Council both regularly
flout the constitution, making Russian federalism a decidedly uneven and uncertain
affair. Therefore the various power ministries and multiple militaries cannot protect
either local parts of the federation, as in the North Caucasus, or the overall
Federation itself. 
The dangers to Russias stability hardly end there. While Moscow still controls
the money supply, and natural monopolies like energy, transport, and power, are
political instruments of central or federal power, powerful financial and economic
groups have also arisen in the provinces and increasingly act like laws unto
themselves.83 Often these associations are also permeated or controlled by outright
criminal gangs as Rushailo suggested.84
The ensuing political economy amounts to a replacement of true market
economics by an economy that is neither fully controlled nor market yet which
seems to be regressing towards a bloated public sector.85 Thus the federal failure
reproduces state control of the economy at lower, local levels and inhibits true
82. S. Blank, Why Russian policy is failing in Asia (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997): 27-34.
83.  Graeme Herd, Russia: Systemic transformation or federal collapse ? Journal of Peace
Research, XXXVI, 3 (1999): 259-269.
84. For example, the PAKT organization in the Far Eastern Republic under Governor Evgenii
Nazdratenko. Julia Latynina, The economy: New actors, old legacies, in Heyward Isham, ed.,
Reconstructing Russia: Perspectives from within (New York: Institute for East-West Studies,
1996): 8.
85. Russia beyond 2000, op. cit.: 8-16.
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economic reform and international integration.86 Equally importantly, since many
provincial governors act without accountability to the law and apparently have
almost total power and even usurp the federal constitution on key points, e.g.
citizenship.87 Arguably (although there are those who disagree like Alexander
Sergounin) the devolution of power has not fostered the deconcentration of power
as often as might be hoped.88
 In regard to security policy and foreign affairs this failure is most dangerous in
those provinces that are borderlands or gateways to neighboring states:
Kaliningrad, the North Caucasus, and the Far East. But the pervasive crisis leads
governors in the interior as well to conduct autonomous foreign economic policy.
Governor Eduard Rossel in Sverdlovsk has pushed to create his own Ministry of
Foreign and International Economic Relations.89 The regional Duma also passed
laws giving Sverdlovsk region the de facto status of a subject of international law.90
Other provincial leaders also negotiate on their own with foreign governments over
economic issues because they know Moscow cannot or will not help them.91 While
this trend greatly disturbs Moscow, it is necessary for otherwise these provinces
might just fall apart. In northwestern Russia and Kaliningrad, for example, officials
well understand the need for effective transborder collaboration to sustain those
regions and enhance Baltic security in general, but they are ambivalent at best, and
often much worse than that about allowing more autonomy or about strategically
implementing such collaboration as a key instrument of overall or even regional
foreign policy.92
Second, new inter-regional linkages and dependencies that will make it harder for
Moscow to exercise future power are replacing the Soviet cross-linkages between the
center and the provinces. Often these are military linkages as well and thus erode
military cohesion and Moscows ability to exercise full command over its troops.
Nazdratenko has paid the Pacific Fleets wage arrears in return for ensuring that only
regionally born officers serve there and Krasnoyarsk Governor Aleksandr Lebed is
following suit.93 As British scholar Graeme Herd recently wrote, 
86. Ibid.; Moscow, Ekspert, in Russian (May 10, 1999), FBIS SOV (May 20, 1999).
87.  G. Herd, art. cit.: 261.
88. Alexander Sergounin, The bright side of Russias regionalization (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University, Davis Center for Russian Studies, April, 1999), Program on new
approaches to Russian security, Policy memo, 59.
89.  G. Herd, art. cit.: 263.
90. Ibid.
91. FBIS SOV (May 20, 1999); Moscow, Nezavisimaia gazeta (electronic version), in Russian
( April 30, 1999), FBIS SOV (May 4, 1999).
92. An excellent example is S. Romanov, Russias regions and transborder cooperation,
International Affairs, 1 (1998): 85-89.
93. G. Herd, art. cit.: 263. 
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Even before the August 1998 meltdown, it was apparent that federal military
structures were being regionalized. As the federal budget has proven ineffective
in paying for basic provisions such as food, accommodations, and energy,
federal troops located in the regions have become dependent upon the regions in
which they are located to survive. The quality of their existence is linked to the
strength of the regional governors support for military unites based on their
territories or republics. Thus, the reality of defense cuts and budget
mismanagement, or even outright corruption, means that regional governors
who are keen to maintain stability in their provinces will provide the necessary
resources gratis.94
The August, 1998 crisis forced 23 of 66 regions to engage in economic separatism
by declaring an emergency and imposing price or food controls that, if unchecked
could erode the federations cohesion. If economic, constitutional, and military
processes of regionalization continue without a break, Moscow will be unable to
dispose of the instruments of security policy nor will foreign governments know
with whom they should deal in Russia. Finally, all three of these three border
regions has become major centers of Russian and/or international crime.
While observers like Sergounin argue that regionalization has important
benefits because it forces Moscow to adapt to localist pressures, allows provincial
governments to negotiate with foreign governments to prevent conflicts over
territory and other disputes and gain real access to foreign economic-political
governments and institutions as real players; it is unclear whether the existing
infrastructure of provincial ties with other states can really answer their problems
and provide them with real security.95 Furthermore Russias asymmetric federalism
obstructs CIS integration. Primakov championed integrating Belarus with Russia
despite strong opposition from reformers like Boris Nemtsov and Anatolii Chubais.
Such a merger would create a single political, economic, and military space,
amounting to a leveraged buyout by Moscow of Belarus. It would also supposedly
generate pressures to further integrate CIS states around Russia and thrust Moscow
back into Europe militarily, even if it further pauperized Russia.
However, Tatarstan and Ingushetia, who negotiated their own deals with
Moscow, announced that any effort to bring Belarus into the Russian Federation via
an alliance with Moscow will lead them to demand expansion of their powers to the
level of sovereign states equal to that of Belarus.96 That could trigger a new
parade of sovereignties like that of the early 1990s that helped undo the Soviet
Union and would fragment further the already weakened Russian Federation. 
Since the federations structural weaknesses are important factors in any
assessment of Russian national security policy, Primakov consistently sought to
94. Ibid.: 261.
95. A. Sergounin, op. cit.
96. On Ingushetias already independent conduct see, Anna Matveeva, Russias policy toward
the North Caucasus: present situation, in Tracey German, ed., Russias security interest in the
North Caucasus (Camberley, Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military
Academy Sandhurst, 1998): 22.
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weaken the regions ability to act autonomously and invoked the danger of Russia
coming apart. But his successes were quite limited. Nazdratenko has defied
Moscows every effort to gain control in Primorskii krai. Moscows long war of
attrition with the Far East has left the latter a barely surviving backwater in Asias
economy and Russian economic-political influence in Asia remains negligible.97
Population is falling in the Far East as Russians return to Russia and their place
is often taken by a creeping Chinese migration whose size cannot be verified but
whose presence visibly alarms the local government and some central elites. Not
surprisingly hopes for growing Sino-Russian economic interchange, based here and
in Chinas adjoining provinces, have been dashed and officially buried. While both
sides abetted this outcome, Russian policies were probably the most harmful ones
here.98
The North Caucasus situation is even more desperate. Its economic crisis
reinforces the separatist trends most evident in Chechnya and the general collapse
of legal order in adjacent provinces like Dagestan. Most Russian analysts would
concur that one of the greatest, if not the greatest, threats to Russias security and
territorial integrity are located here. Indeed, at the time of this writing Karachai-
Cherkessia almost exploded and there are widespread fears that Dagestan might
join with Chechnya thereby obliging a forceful response from Moscow.99 Violence
in the form of kidnappings, bombings, and hijackings is endemic and pervasive.
This is not surprising since in many areas unemployment is 80%. But it is also clear
that Moscow lacks resources, policies, or answers to deal with the economic,
political, ethnic, and other issues that torment this region. Yet Moscow almost went
to war with Chechnya in April, 1999. The region remains out of control except in
heavily militarized areas and even there one cannot be sure for the Russian armed
forces are notoriously corrupt. For example, military officers routinely sell their
men to the Chechens as slaves since Moscow does not pay them!100 Here the
collapse of the federal bargain intersects with the general incoherence of defense
policy in a state of multiple rival militaries. The resulting disarray constantly
threatens to unhinge the entire state. For the center of gravity in any future wars in
the North Caucasus will be the regime in Moscow more than whatever local
97. Felix K. Chang, The unraveling of Russias Far Eastern power, Orbis, XLIII, 2 (Spring,
1999): 257-284, id., The Russian Far Easts endless winter, ibid., XLIII, 1 (Winter, 1999):
77-110.
98. The many recent works by Gilbert Rozman illustrate the dilemmas of local regionalization,
see G. Rozman, Northeast China: Waiting for regionalization, Problems of Post-
Communism, XLV, 4 (July-August, 1998): 3-13, id., The crisis of the Russian Far East: Who
is to blame?, ibid., XLIV, 5 (September-October, 1997): 3-12; id., Flawed regionalization:
Reconceptualizing Northeast Asia in the 1990s, The Pacific Review, XI, 1 (1998): 1-27, and
Cross-national integration in Northeast Asia: Geopolitical and economic goals in conflict,
East Asia, XVI, 1-2 (1998): 6-43.
99. Moscow, Nezavisimaia gazeta, in Russian (May 25, 1999), FBIS SOV (May 25, 1999);
Igor Rotar, The North Caucasus  Specific tension factors in the region, Prism, 8 (April 23,
1999): Part 3.
100.  Moscow, Kommersant Digest (May 19, 1999).
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governments are involved. And one cannot be certain of Moscows victory in such
conflicts.101
Moscow has been unable to visualize Kaliningrad in primarily economic terms.
Thus neither Moscow nor the regional government has been able to turn this
exclave into a true economic gateway to one of Europes fastest growing regions.
Instead, Moscow continues to view Kaliningrad as mainly a geopolitical asset
whose destiny must be centrally controlled. This approach, along with previously
ham-fisted policies towards the Baltic states, has inhibited regional economic
growth to the point where the Kaliningrad Special Military Districts forces had to
forage for food in the fall of 1998. Nor were they alone in experiencing food
shortages.102 While some Russian politicians toy with making it a state on its own
or other solutions, clearly misguided policies have held back a region that adjoins
some of Europes fastest growing states. Hence Kaliningrad could easily
explode.103
The net result of the struggle between the regions and governments in Moscow
is not a strong center with strong regions, or one strong and the other weak, but
rather weak regions and a weak center. Consequently analysts like Herd now
discern trends pointing toward the Federations fragmentation.104 While this
outcome is hardly foreordained; today the current runs away from Moscow.
Trends in military policy confirm this trend and could become very dangerous
indeed for Russian security. Russias interior regions and republics already have
successfully obstructed key security policies.105 The crisis of center-periphery
relations has already also encouraged potentially dangerous symbiotic local
governmental relationships with the armed forces. Already in 1992 opportunistic
regional politicians formed coalitions with the armed forces to frustrate major
101. Neither can Russias current forces suffice to defend against internal secessionist threats.
In March-April, 1999 when Chechen guerrillas kidnapped high-ranking MVD General
Gennadii Shpigun, Stepashin seemed ready to start a war against them on his own authority.
Yeltsin and his national security advisor, General Nikolai Bordyuzha, both made themselves
scarce, leaving Primakov with the unhappy burden of decision. Primakov rightly insisted that
there be no war despite the MVDs missile rattling because he understood that such a war was
not winnable, something that may have been lost on the MVD.
102. St. Petersburg, Na srazhe rodiny, in Russian (February 26, 1999), FBIS SOV (March 29,
1999); Moscow, Vremia (September 29, 1998) as quoted in Sergei Khrushchev, Russias
gambling capitalism, Mediterranean Quarterly, X, 1 (Winter, 1999): 53; see also Moscow,
Nezavisimaia gazeta (electronic version), (March 12, 1999), FBIS-SOV (March 16, 1999).
103. For an overall and international discussion of Kaliningrad, see Pertti Joenniemi and Jan
Prawitz, eds, Kaliningrad: The European amber region (Aldershot, Hampshire, England:
Ashgate Publishing ltd., 1998).
104. G. Herd, art. cit.: 259-269.
105. Nikolai Fedorov exempts his servicemen from being sent to Groznyi, Current Digest
of the Post-Soviet Press, XLVII, 2 (February 8, 1995): 23; Philip Hanson, Regions, local
power and economic change in Russia, in Alan Smith, ed., Challenges for Russian eonomic
reform (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution for the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1995): 26n.
720 STEPHEN BLANK
central diplomatic initiatives.106 They thereby established a dangerous but lasting
precedent by showing Moscows inability to prevent them and the armed forces
from openly forging political coalitions against central policies.
Indeed, precisely because Moscow has often abdicated its responsibilities to the
regions and the armed forces or cannot fulfill them, it has frequently encouraged
joint action by regional political and military authorities.107 Now any further
devolution of power becomes an incentive for civilian and military leaders to join to
defend shared defense or foreign policies. Incentives for autonomous action may
grow as the devolution of military power in the newly created military districts
empower their commanders and give them more opportunities to cooperate with
local political authorities, even if their territorial jurisdictions do not always overlap
with those of the latter. Since the regions can withhold tax revenues from Moscow
for use at home, they possess real resources with which to buy armed support.108
 While the internal fractures among the armed forces militate against a coup by a
serving officer, todays situation holds several real risks. Regional or central
leaders may use the armed forces who support them in a bid for power or secession.
In that case, polls conducted among army officers reveal that a large majority of
them oppose using the army for internal purposes like stopping a provinces
secession.109 That finding raises the danger that some military forces will go over to
the secessionist side or rebel against Moscow if a coup or another misconceived
war like that against Chechnya is launched. Alternatively a commander could begin
conducting his own foreign policy, e.g. using the Border Troops. Or he and/or
political leader could create their own military-police forces from official and
paramilitary forces. In multiethnic areas, like the North Caucasus, the potential for
a scenario, reminiscent of OAS (Organisation armée secrète) in Algeria could also
develop. Since the military reforms of 1997 gave district commanders in chief
enormous and unprecedented powers and stripped them away from the central
MOD apparatus in Moscow, the power of a regional commander to bolt from
central control and form powerful and even independent local or regional political
alliances with the authorities in the province has greatly grown. Simultaneously the
practical motive for doing so has also grown spectacularly.
106. S. Blank, The New Russia in the New Asia, International Journal, XLIX, 4 (Autumn,
1994): 875-877. 
107. Andrei Zhukov, Gubernatorial elections, Prism, II, 2, Part 4 (September, 1996);
Krasnaia zvezda, in Russian (May 28, 1996), FBIS-SOV, 96-103 (May 28, 1996): 29-30;
Timothy L. Thomas, Fault lines and factions in the Russian army, Orbis, XXXIX, 4 (Fall,
1995): 538.
108. Jacques Sapir, What kind of armed forces the Russian economy could support, Paper
presented to the SSI, RAND, University of London, Conference on the Russian Armed Forces,
University of London, May 16-18, 1995, pp. 22-23.
109. D. Y. Ball, How reliable are Russias officers,? art. cit.: 204-207. 
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Conclusions
Clearly we stand at a turning point. Due to the confluence of pressures: Kosovo,
NATO enlargement, U.S. efforts to bypass the ABM treaty, political stagnation,
economic collapse, military decrepitude, etc. Russian national security policy
appears to stand before an impasse. Having failed to make a transition either to
democracy or to the market, Russia is now bereft of political or intellectual
guidance as to what must be done. It demands a role it cannot fulfill, destabilizes
itself and its neighborhood with disturbing regularity, and faces enormous
challenges in every area of security.
One cannot even begin to predict what direction Russia might choose or be
forced to take. But the context within which it operates, not to mention the changing
international system, seems to forestall any hope of escape from another protracted
crisis. But given the context delineated above what basis exists upon which we can
predict a resolution to that crisis that gives us a liberal Russia, integrated into
Europe and at peace with itself, not to mention its neighbors and interlocutors?
Unfortunately only Russia can answer that question. Until and unless it does so,
Russias foreign partners will have to hedge against Moscow as much as they
welcome her into their community. However, increasingly that complex double
task seems to be not only beyond their capabilities but also beyond their interest.
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